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Controlling excess capacity in common-pool
resource industries: the transition from input to
output controls*
Dale Squires, Yongil Jeon, R. Quentin Grafton and
James Kirkley†
Overcapacity is a major problem in common-pool resources. Regulators increas-
ingly turn from limited entry to individual transferable use rights to address overca-
pacity. Using individual vessel data from before and after the introduction of
individual harvest rights into a fishery, the paper investigates how characteristics of
rights, scale of operations and transition period affect changes in individual and
fleet capacity utilisation and excess capacity. The results indicate that individual
harvest rights in both theory and practice offer the potential to address the problem
of overcapacity in common-pool resources currently managed with limited-entry
regulations.
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1. Introduction
Overcapacity is a well-known problem with the exploitation of common-pool
resources. For example, firms may wish to invest in inputs to ensure that they
can secure a minimum viable level of production from the scarce resource.1
Such investments are individually rational provided that the benefits of
the investment outweigh the associated costs, but for the industry as a whole
they are wasteful because they simply redistribute the scarce output or
* Grafton is grateful for the financial support provided by the Social Sciences and Humani-
ties Research Council of Canada and the assistance of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans
in supplying the data used in the analysis. The results are not necessarily those of the U.S.
National Marine Fisheries Service. The authors are grateful for comments and suggestions
from Rob Felthoven and two anonymous referees.
† Dale Squires is at the U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service, Yongil Jeon (email:
yjeon@skku.edu) is at the School of Economics, Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, Korea,
R. Quentin Grafton is Professor of Economics, Crawford School of Economics and Gov-
ernment, The Australian National University, Canberra, ACT, Australia and James Kirkley
is Professor of Marine Science, College of William and Mary School of Marine Science,
Gloucester Pt, VA 23061, USA.
1 The emphasis in some common-pool resources, such as fisheries, is frequently on overcapi-
talisation. Overcapitalisation, however, entails only excessive amounts of the capital stock and
overlooks other potential stock resources such as labour (which is sometimes variable and
sometimes fixed) and variable inputs. Hence, the emphasis on overcapitalisation overlooks the
entire bundle of inputs that are excessively allocated to the sector.
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yield between firms without increasing overall output or revenues. Over-
capacity also raises the potential – and sometimes the actual – exploitation
rate of the resource stock, which itself may well be overexploited.2 By raising
their debt load, overcapacity makes firms more vulnerable to changes in the
resource base, regulations, environmental conditions and prices. Excess
capacity may also make it difficult for the regulator to reduce the total yield
in response to declines in the resource stock without imposing bankruptcies
and job losses, or lead to negative spillovers in other industries and resources.
To overcome overcapacity, regulators increasingly use output controls,
and especially transferable property rights, rather than input controls. Trans-
ferable harvest rights for individual fishing vessels are commonly called indi-
vidual transferable quotas (ITQs) and give firms a fixed share of the total
allowable catch (TAC).3 If harvesting rights are well-defined and transferable,
there are no transaction costs and with sufficient time, firms can either exit or
trade to a desired level of capacity utilisation. Thus, ITQs can potentially
prevent further increases in overcapacity in fisheries that would occur in
limited-entry fisheries with input controls and offer the possibility of
increased capacity utilisation for those firms that remain fishing and purchase
ITQs to achieve a desirable scale of production.
Despite the growing use of ITQs in fisheries and the worldwide problem of
overcapacity in fisheries, only Dupont et al. (2002) tested for changes in
capacity immediately following the introduction of transferable harvesting
rights. Only a limited number of studies have tested for the changes in capac-
ity using data from before, at the time of introduction, and some years after
the implementation of ITQs.4 Such analysis is required to assess whether the
benefits of ITQs to reduce excess capacity and raise capacity utilisation have,
in fact, been realised. Thus, our paper helps shed light on the following ques-
tions: how rapidly does adjustment in capacity utilisation occur with the
introduction of individual harvesting rights? Do differences in the characteris-
tics of the property rights (especially transferability) have an impact on the
capacity changes? To what extent does the existing level of capacity of firms
influence changes in capacity and CU over time? Using individual firm data
2 This is particularly true of fisheries not regulated with a TAC but instead are controlled by
a limited opening. For example, in escapement fisheries like salmon fisheries, fishers are permit-
ted to fish only at very restricted periods so as to allow sufficient fish to escape up river to
spawn. The greater the fishing capacity, the more difficult it is for the regulator to estimate the
timing of the ‘opening’ to fish, and the greater the likelihood that more fish will be harvested
that is desired from a biological perspective.
3 Like our paper, Asche et al. (2009), by distinguishing between nontransferable and trans-
ferable quotas, discuss the importance of transferability for capacity adjustment. They analyse
a fishery with individual but not transferable quotas, indicating that the corrected incentives
using individual quotas do not improve their situation, as the main challenge is the capacity,
which is only reduced with transferability. Also, Homans and Wilen (2005) discuss the impor-
tant feature of changes in fishing practices that increase revenue rather than improve capacity
utilisation although this is not directly relevant in using a primal approach like our paper.
4 The recent literature on estimating the change in the CU in fisheries includes Felthoven
(2002), Weninger (2008), Lian et al. (2008) and Weninger (1998).
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from the British Columbia halibut fishery from before and after the introduc-
tion of ITQs, the paper addresses each of these questions by providing indi-
vidual and fleet capacity and CU measures and testing for changes in these
measures over time and across vessel size (Homans and Wilen 1997).
Section 2 reviews the notions of capacity and CU, in renewable common-
pool resource industries with stock-flow production technologies. Section 3
describes the BC halibut fishery that was in the transition phase. Section 4
tests for changes in capacity and CU from before and after the introduction
of ITQs. Section 5 discusses the empirical results at the level of the individual
firm and for the industry, while Section 6 concludes.
2. Capacity and capacity utilisation and common-pool resources
Traditional measures of capacity and CU are primal measures and are based
on the notion of sustainable maximum possible output given the fixed factors,
where variable inputs are fully utilised under normal operating conditions
(Morrison 1985; Corrado and Mattey 1997).5 Johansen (1968) was one of the
first to develop a primal measure of capacity, which was later extended by
Fa¨re et al. (1989). Primal measures of capacity correspond to the full-input
point on a production function, provided that it is sustainable (Klein and
Long 1973).6 CU is usually defined as the ratio of actual output to some mea-
sure of potential output (Morrison 1985; Nelson 1989). Thus, a CU value less
than unity implies that firms have the potential for greater production with-
out having to incur major expenditures for new capital or equipment (Klein
and Summers 1966).
In common-pool resource industries, firms face at least two factors or
stocks that affect their capacity – the resource stock and the stock of capital.
Measures of capacity and capacity utilisation then face the unique issue of
accounting for the resource stock because the greater the stock, and hence
5 Morrison (1993) and Corrado and Mattey (1997) discuss the definition of full employment
or full utilisation level of variable inputs. They note that it depends upon the type of technol-
ogy and institutional factors that constitute issues such as ‘normal’ downtime. Short-run out-
put varies with technology type in different ways according to (i) duration and (ii) intensity or
speed of operations. Duration, rather than intensity, is generally more important in fishing
industries, because the biological conditions (e.g. species type) tend to dictate speed of opera-
tions such as tow speed or encircling rates or ‘soak’ time in the water for passive line or net
gear. Intensity plays a larger role in defining full utilisation of the variable inputs, to the extent
that on-board processing constrains intensity.
6 Klein and Long (1973, p. 744) state that, ‘Full capacity should be defined as an attainable
level of output that can be reached under normal input conditions – without lengthening
accepted working weeks, and allowing for usual vacations and for normal maintenance.’ Garo-
falo and Malhotra (1997) observe that the U.S. Bureau of the Census survey uses the concept
of practical capacity, defined as ‘the maximum level of production that this establishment
could reasonably expect to obtain using a realistic employee work schedule with the machinery
and equipment in place’ and assuming a normal product mix and downtime for maintenance,
repair and cleanup. Both Klein and Long and Garofalo and Malhotra discuss the dependence
of full capacity upon ‘normal operating conditions’. Normal operating conditions, in turn, are
implicitly dependent upon the structure of property rights and the associated institutions.
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surplus yield or flow of overall output, the higher the CU of firms for a given
stock of capital or other fixed factors. Capacity measures are thus contingent
on the level of both the resource stock and the firms’ capital stocks. To
account for this phenomenon, a technological economic measure of capacity
can be defined as the maximum yield in a given period of time that can be
produced given the current technology, state of the resource and environmen-
tal parameters while keeping fixed factors at their current level and with the
unrestricted use of the variable inputs under normal operating conditions.7
An important issue when measuring capacity in common-pool resource
industries is that the resource stock must either not decline over time or
always remain above a minimum viable level. This sustainability requires that
the industry’s overall output flow not exceed a sustainable target yield, such
as maximum sustainable yield, and maintain the resource stock at a corre-
sponding sustainable target level.8 Thus, from the perspective of the techno-
logical economic primal approach, industry excess capacity exists whenever
industry capacity output exceeds the target sustainable level of industry out-
put, the latter as defined by a sustainable TAC (FAO 1998, 2000; Kirkley and
Squires 1999). By contrast, in other industries that do not exploit a common-
pool resource stock, excess capacity is defined as the level of capacity output
for an individual firm in excess of current output.
3. Capacity and the British Columbia halibut fishery
The BC halibut fishery, prior to the introduction of ITQs, limited entry with
input controls. Strict limits were placed on the minimum fish size that can be
harvested for biological reasons, and a total harvesting limit ensured a sus-
tainable exploitable biomass. Over time, increasing restrictions were placed
on eligibility to fish for halibut in Canadian waters. Because of protests and
appeals by BC fishers, licences were allocated even to fishers without signifi-
cant association in the fishery. Thus, a total of 435 halibut vessel licences were
allocated in 1979, despite only about active 300 vessels.
The restriction on vessel entry failed to prevent increased fishing effort of
those vessels already in the fishery. Vessel length and gear restrictions were
7 Specification of the resource stock as a technological constraint rather than as a natural
capital stock under the control of an individual firm circumvents the indeterminancy problem
of capacity and CU with multiple capital stocks under the control of firms. That is, provided
there is a single capital stock, specification of the resource stock as a technological constraint
does not specify a second capital stock under the control of the firm. This indeterminancy
problem is compounded when there are multiple outputs along with multiple capital stocks
(Berndt and Fuss 1989).
8 The target level of output (resource flow) can be a moving target if the target level of out-
put is periodically adjusted, such as when the resource stock is not presently at a long-term
optimal level. If the management authority intends to let the resource stock grow, i.e. the
resource is in a rebuilding phase, then the sustainable target should be sufficiently small enough
to allow growth of the resource stock to exceed depletions from exploitation. The exploitation
rate could exceed the target yield if the resource stock is in a drawing down phase starting from
high levels of resource abundance.
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subsequently imposed to address the problem, and the season length was
systematically reduced over the 1980s due to capture of the TAC in a
progressively smaller period of time. Contributing to the problem was the
gradual ‘take-up’ and use of the unused, but allocated, halibut fishing licences
such that from 1980 to 1990, the number of active vessels increased by 30 per
cent, while the number of fishing days declined by over 90 per cent (Table 1
and Turner and Weninger 2005).
The increase in the number of vessels was also associated with an increase
in the number of crew per vessel and duration of fishing per vessel per day.
The use of the fishing season as an input control exacerbated the overcapacity
problem because it provided an additional incentive, over and above the
rivalry associated with catching a scarce TAC, for firms to invest in inputs
and catch their desired share of the TAC before the season ended. For
example, if fishers have a standardised and fixed catch rate of q per level of
fishing effort unit per day, with a fixed TAC and identical fishers, then the
smallest aggregate fleet fishing effort needed to catch the total harvest in a




Thus, for a fixed TAC and q, a decrease in the season length increases the
minimum total fleet fishing effort and reduces the CU.9 The end result of a
Table 1 Season length, number of active fishing vessels and total catch in the BC halibut
fishery
Year Season length (days) Number of active vessels Total catch (pounds)
1980 65 333 5 650 447
1981 58 337 5 654 856
1982 61 301 5 524 783
1983 24 305 5 416 757
1984 22 334 8 276 152
1985 22 363 9 587 902
1986 15 417 10 240 471
1987 16 424 12 251 086
1988 14 435 12 859 562
1989 11 435 10 738 715
1990 6 435 8 569 367
1991 214 433 7 189 273
1992 240 431 7 630 198
1993 245 351 10 560 141
1994 245 313 9 900 958
1995 245 294 9 499 717
1996 245 281 9 499 717
Source: Grafton et al. (2000).
9 This result is adapted from Clark (1990, p. 263), who shows the same outcome in terms of
the smallest fleet capable of catching the TAC over the entire season.
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decline in the fishing season in the fishery was that by 1990, it was just 6 days
long for each vessel and, by various measures (vessel numbers, variable inputs
employed), fishing inputs had substantially increased since the introduction
of limited-entry regulations 11 years earlier.
The failure of limited-entry and input controls to prevent further ‘effort
creep’ led a group of fishers to request that the regulator introduce a system
of ITQs. The fishers initiating this request believed that a switch to individual
output controls would make the season length restriction redundant and
allow more profitable fishers to expand their operations by purchasing har-
vesting rights from the less profitable. Following extensive deliberations and
a vote in 1990 in which the majority of fishers voted in favour of introducing
ITQs, the new management system was introduced in 1991. ITQs were allo-
cated gratis to vessel owners on a formula based on the best catch in the pre-
vious 4 years and the vessel size. This allocation tended to favour more
marginal fishers, who may have had only one good harvest, and also fishers
with larger vessels.
For the 1991 and 1992 seasons, the individual harvest rights were not trans-
ferable except when the halibut fishing license and vessel were sold together.
Starting in 1993, the harvest rights were made transferable among halibut
license holders, although restrictions remained on both the divisibility of the
rights and the total amount of rights that any one vessel can have (Casey
et al. 1995; Grafton et al. 2000). Continuing limits on the divisibility of quota
have tended to favour larger vessels that have the scale of operations to buy
quota in larger quantities, and quota trading has tended to increase the aver-
age size of vessels.
Introduction of ITQs in 1991 also rendered the season length restriction
redundant as a method to control total fleet harvest. Thus, the season length
increased dramatically from just 6 days in 1990 to 214 days in 1991 and sub-
sequently to 245 days. However, restrictions remain on the gear that can be
used to catch halibut and vessel length restrictions attached to the halibut
license and other species licenses in BC.
4. Testing for changes in capacity and capacity utilisation
Individual vessel data from the BC halibut fishery offer a unique opportunity
to measure capacity output and CU before and after the introduction of indi-
vidual harvesting rights. Data are available from 44 vessels in 1988 when the
fishery was under limited-entry regulations, from 44 vessels in 1991 when
individual harvesting rights were first introduced, and from 19 vessels in
1994, 3 years after the introduction of individual output controls and a year
after the harvesting rights were made transferable and more divisible. Unfor-
tunately, the data are not from a panel of vessels but are from randomly
selected cross sections of vessels in all three periods. The mean and standard
deviation of the revenue, harvests and costs of the sample fishers, in all three
periods, are provided in Table 2.
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The data for the 107 observations were used to solve the output-oriented
data envelopment analysis (DEA) of Fa¨re et al. (1989), which is specified in
Appendix I. The DEA model specifies output as the round weight of halibut
landed (pounds) per vessel per day fished and the vessel’s capital stock and
fixed input is measured by its gross registered tonnage. Capacity output in the
stock-flow production technology of a natural resource industry is condi-
tional upon the natural resource stock. Thus, halibut biomass (tons) is also
included as a fixed variable and is divided by the number of days fished for
each vessel to be consistent with the specification of output on a daily basis.
The excess capacity measures are conditional on the duration of the fishing
season and number of vessels, given the resource stock size and availability.
Any meaningful comparison over time therefore requires a standardised
metric, which is provided by the capacity output measure per vessel per day
Table 2 Summary statistics of the data
Variable 1988, 1991, 1994 1988
Mean Std. Dev. Mean St. Dev
Vessel length (metres) 14.10 5.45 14.48 3.54
Crew weeks 12.91 9.68 15.68 11.33
Fuel quantity (litres) 6995.15 9505.11 8303.38 13 201.26
Halibut revenue 88 747.81 70 140.23 107 329.48 74 208.75
Price of halibut 2.78 0.72 2.03 0.15
Halibut landings (pounds) 34 026.63 28 966.98 51 769.55 33 978.76
Crew 3.78 1.48 4.52 1.55
Weeks fished 3.36 1.92 3.39 1.97
Landings/crew 8143.52 4561.69 10 735.89 4863.64
Landings/week 11 731.65 9798.18 17 541.05 11 388.93
Fuel cost 2420.62 3634.45 3257.05 5137.61
Labour cost 2081.87 740.22 2346.55 767.18
No. observations 107 44
1991 1994
Vessel length (metres) 13.44 7.34 14.73 3.77
Crew weeks 8.57 5.39 16.53 9.85
Fuel quantity (litres) 4153.69 2767.51 10 545.78 7758.94
Revenue 51 378.07 34 241.58 132 257.05 82 213.02
Price 3.08 0.21 3.85 0.30
Halibut landings (pounds) 16 475.10 10 690.77 33 583.47 19 681.81
Crew 3.02 1.09 3.79 1.28
Weeks fished 2.91 1.79 4.37 1.74
Landings/crew 5224.56 1972.49 8682.33 4283.86
Landings/week 7199.40 5809.97 8653.84 6131.51
Fuel cost 1122.86 710.79 3488.95 2548.30
Labour cost 1745.87 590.17 2247.05 715.96
No. observations 44 19
Notes: All values are in 1994 Canadian dollars and are per vessel. Crew size includes captain. Weeks fished
pertain to weeks actively fishing halibut. Halibut landings are in pounds, and the price is per pound. Fuel
quantity is in litres and vessel length in metres.
Source: Grafton et al. (2000).
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of operation.10 A daily measure of vessel capacity output allows for the full
utilisation of the variable inputs and accounts for the differences in season
length before and after the introduction of ITQs. Daily measures may be
extrapolated to an annual basis for each vessel by multiplying the capacity
output per vessel per day of operation by the number of days in the halibut
season. Measuring capacity output on a daily production basis thus solves
the problem of a varying annual production period because of the regulations
in fishing industries. Duration of the fishing season also helps to establish the
prevailing normal operating conditions, such that multiplying this measure
by the number of vessels in the fleet gives annual industry capacity.11
A second-stage analysis evaluated the vessel-and-per-day effects of ITQs
on the fleet by regressing capacity output and CU per vessel per day upon
dummy variables for year and vessel size classes.12 The explanatory variables
in these regressions were annual dummy variables for 1988 (D88), 1991(D91)
and 1994 (D94), which were multiplied by dummy variables for two size clas-
ses of vessel length: small, or less than 1400 cm (DS) and large, equal to or
greater than 1400 cm (DL). Tobit regressions accounted for the censoring of
the CU measures at zero and one when CU was the dependent variable (CU
ranges between 0 and 1 inclusive). Ordinary least squares were used when
capacity output was the dependent variable.
Using the second-stage regression results, the effects of transferable prop-
erty rights were evaluated by tests of the null hypothesis of no changes in
capacity or CU between the three time periods (1988–1991, 1991–1994 and
1988–1994) and for a given vessel size class (large and small). Thus, H0: D88
DS)D91 DS = 0 tests the null hypothesis of equal capacity or CU for small
vessels between 1988 and 1991. F-tests were used with the ordinary least
squares regressions, but Wald tests were used with the Tobit regressions.
5. Transferable property rights and capacity
Summary measures of the mean halibut capacity output per vessel per
operating day over the 3 years 1988, 1991 and 1994, and all years com-
bined are reported in Table 3. Mean capacity per vessel per operating day
10 The data preclude us from quantitatively accounting for intensity, because we do not
have, for example, the number of hours fished per day or the number of lines with their ‘soak’
time.
11 This approach allows capacity to be calculated corresponding to normal operating condi-
tions. Specifying the number of days or vessels and multiplying the capacity per day by the
number of days gives the normal operating conditions. Capacity per day could also be multi-
plied by each vessel group’s maximum observed days at sea when calculating the annual capac-
ity measures. Projections for the future are found by multiplying capacity per day by the
expected days at sea and number of vessels.
12 This approach allows us to account properly for the data set as a pooled time series of
cross sections rather than as a panel data set, because we evaluate cohorts – vessel size classes –
rather than individual vessels over time (Deaton 1995). Specifically, the regression coefficients
for each cohort in each time period are sample means for that cohort-time period.
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over all three periods combined was 92 147 pounds, and the mean CU per
vessel was 0.38. Mean daily capacity output and CU were both higher for
large vessels compared to small vessels over all 3 years combined, and for
each individual year.
The results indicate that all vessels did not fully utilise their daily capacity,
but this effect is emphasised for smaller vessels. For 1991, this difference was,
in part, accentuated because the initial allocation of harvesting rights tended
to favour larger vessels. Table 3 also indicates that capacity output declined
for both small and large vessels from 1988 to 1991, and again from 1991 to
1994, and over the entire period from 1988 to 1994. By contrast, CU first
dipped and then rose for all vessels taken together, and separately for both
small and large vessels.
Second-stage regression analysis can be used to test the null hypotheses
of no change in capacity output and CU per vessel per operating day for
Table 3 Summary statistics of capacity and capacity utilisation per vessel per day
Capacity CU
All Small Large All Small Large
Vessels Vessels Vessels Vessels Vessels Vessels
All years 1988–1994
Mean 92 147 84 239 107 744 0.38 0.32 0.51
Median 97 883 93 549 112 309 0.33 0.21 0.51
Maximum 162 100 125 296 162 100 1.00 1.00 1.00
Minimum 7881 7881 47 353 0.06 0.06 0.07
Std. Dev. 32 421 30 780 30 193 0.27 0.27 0.25
Observations 107 71 36 107 71 36
Year 1988
Mean 111 408 103 581 121 706 0.47 0.40 0.55
Median 114 167 108 411 124 651 0.47 0.41 0.58
Maximum 162 100 125 296 162 100 1.00 1.00 1.00
Minimum 19 874 19 874 47 353 0.06 0.06 0.07
Std. Dev. 27 331 24 983 27 481 0.26 0.26 0.24
Observations 44 25 19 44 25 19
Year 1991
Mean 84 703 79 534 102 278 0.23 0.20 0.31
Median 87 093 87 093 99 245 0.17 0.16 0.35
Maximum 136 984 120 608 136 984 1.00 1.00 0.47
Minimum 7881 7881 66 076 0.06 0.06 0.12
Std. Dev. 30 616 29 894 27 526 0.18 0.18 0.12
Observations 44 34 10 44 34 10
Year 1994
Mean 64 782 57 273 77 654 0.55 0.47 0.68
Median 69 371 58 147 82 664 0.51 0.37 0.70
Maximum 90 654 79 101 90 654 1.00 1.00 0.95
Minimum 31 082 31 082 54 637 0.07 0.07 0.27
Std. Dev. 18 263 16 556 13 856 0.32 0.34 0.23
Observations 19 12 7 19 12 7
Note: Small vessels £1400 cm length. Large vessels >1400 cm length.
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all vessels, and for small and large vessels separately, over the three periods
1988–1991, 1991–1994 and 1988–1994. The estimates of the coefficients of
the dummy variables are the mean values for the defined subgroups – ves-
sels and years – given in Table 4. All coefficients are significant at the 5
per cent level, with the exception of the coefficient D91 for small vessels.
Table 5 reports the detailed hypothesis test results. Table 6 summarises the
results of the hypothesis tests and whether daily vessel capacity catch
Table 4 Second-stage regression results





Coeff 0.422 103 581.10
t-stat 41.774 19.81
1991 small vessels
Coeff 0.077 79 534.04
t-stat 1.606 17.74
1994 small vessels
Coeff 0.255 57 272.92
t-stat 2.454 7.59
1988 large vessels
Coeff 0.557 121 706.40
t-stat 21.335 20.29
1991 large vessels
Coeff 0.401 102 278.20
t-stat 27.292 12.37
1994 large vessels




Notes: All variables are dummy variables. The estimates were obtained using the Berndt–Hall–Hall–
Hausman maximisation algorithm.
Table 5 Tests of significance for changes in daily vessel capacity output and capacity utilisa-
tion over time and by vessel size class
Null hypotheses Capacity per vessel per day Capacity utilisation per
vessel per day
Test statistic Significance Test statistic Significance
1988 Small = 1991 Small 12.18 0.00 36.99 0.00
1988 Large = 1991 Large 3.62 0.06 19.66 0.00
1991 Small = 1994 Small 6.43 0.01 3.73 0.06
1991 Large = 1994 Large 3.65 0.06 9.61 0.00
1988 Small = 1994 Small 25.43 0.00 2.33 0.13
1988 Large = 1994 Large 14.52 0.00 2.92 0.09
Notes: 1. Hypothesis tests for capacity output per vessel per day are F-tests with one degree of freedom.
2. Hypothesis tests for capacity utilisation are Wald tests with one degree of freedom.
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and CU increased or decreased and whether the change was statistically
significant.
Table 6 indicates that capacity output per vessel per operating day for both
small and large vessels significantly declined between 1988 and 1991, falling by
23 per cent for small vessels and 16 per cent for large vessels. The significant
decline in daily vessel capacity output for small vessels continued over the per-
iod 1991 to 1994, falling by a further 28 per cent. Although daily capacity catch
per vessel also fell for large vessels from 1991 to 1994, the decline was signifi-
cant at the 6 per cent level. Over the entire period 1988 to 1994, daily vessel
capacity catch fell significantly for small vessels by 45 per cent and fell by 36
per cent for large vessels. Daily vessel CU for small vessels significantly
declined at the 1 per cent level over the period from 1988 to 1991 and at the 6
per cent level for the period from 1991 to 1994 but did not significantly change
for the period from 1988 to 1994. Such a decline is attributable, in part, to the
initial allocation of harvesting rights favouring larger vessels and because of
the 44 per cent decline in TAC from 1988 to 1991. For large vessels, daily vessel
CU declined at 1 per cent level of significance from 1988 to 1991, increased at 1
per cent from 1991 to 1994, and increased at 10 per cent over 1988–1994.
In sum, over the entire time period, the introduction of individual harvest
rights was associated with a decline in production capacity per vessel per
operating day for both vessel size classes. Moreover, the introduction of indi-
vidual harvest rights coincided with a significant increase in CU per vessel per
operating day for large vessels from 1991 to 1994. In part, the higher CU for
large vessels may be explained by their favourable treatment in the initial allo-
cation of quota in 1991. In addition, a larger scale of operations likely gives
larger vessels greater flexibility to adjust their capacity, especially in terms of
variable inputs like labour.
5.1 Explaining changes in capacity and capacity utilisation per vessel per day:
1988–1991
Capacity output per vessel per operating day for both small and large vessels
fell because of both reduced crew size (Table 2) and a reduced duration of the
Table 6 Percentage change and significance of daily vessel capacity and capacity utilisation




Small vessels Large vessels
1988–1991 1991–1994 1988–1994 1988–1991 1991–1994 1988–1994
Capacity per
vessel per day




)81.8* +231.2 )39.6 )28.0* +83.5* +32.1
*Statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.
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fishing day or trip. This occurred because the frenzied production rate under
the limited-entry fishery no longer existed with the 15-fold increase in the fish-
ing season from 1988 to 1991. An important factor in the unexpected decline
in CU per vessel per operating day from 1988 to 1991 was the 44 per cent
drop in the TAC – the sustainable target industry output – from 5833 to 3261
metric tons. This almost 50 per cent decline in the total permitted sustainable
output forced both small and large vessels to harvest much less than they
wished.
Another important explanation for the lack of increase in CU between
1988 and 1991 is that individual harvest rights were not transferable in 1991
or 1992. Thus, firms did not face a market price associated with a marginal
change in harvesting and could neither overcome any harvest constraint by
purchasing quota nor increase their fishing effort to compensate for the
decline in the TAC because the individual output controls were fully enforced
by the regulator. In other words, individual output controls without transfer-
ability, combined with a large decline in the TAC and a removal of season
length constraint reduced the CU per operating day of vessels. The net result
was that CU per vessel per day of production declined, despite the fact that
capacity fell over the period.
5.2 Explaining changes in capacity and capacity utilisation per vessel per day:
1991–1994
Beginning in 1993, individual harvest rights have been transferable among
the 435 fishers with a halibut fishing licence. Transferability has allowed
some vessels to expand their scale of operations by buying quota from exiting
vessels. Thus, trading has enabled some firms to exit and others to accumu-
late quota, increasing the scale of their operations and thereby matching
quota holdings to capacity output. Overall quota trading increased the con-
centration of individual harvest rights with firms having larger vessels. As a
result, the number of active vessels in the industry fell from close to its
maximum level of 433 in 1991 to 313 in 1994, a decline of about 28 per cent.
Vessel numbers continued to decline as vessels consolidated their holdings of
harvesting rights, and by 1996 there were only 282 vessels operating in the
fishery.
Transferability of the harvest rights also permitted excess capacity to exit
the fishery and allowed firms that have remained in the industry to increase
their capacity utilisation. Thus, for both small and large vessels, mean capac-
ity catch per vessel per operating day fell and CU per vessel per operating day
increased over the 1991–1994 period. However, the only statistically signifi-
cant changes were the declines in capacity output per vessel per operating day
for small vessels and the increases in CU per vessel per operating day for large
vessels.
An almost 50 per cent increase in the TAC from 1991 to 1994 combined
with a decline in the number of active vessels has contributed to a doubling of
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the mean landings of sample fishers over the period. Thus, a higher output
per vessel because of both a larger TAC and quota accumulation, coupled
with a declining or stable capacity output per vessel per operating day, con-
tributed to the 83 per cent increase in the mean CU per vessel per operating
day for large vessels over the period 1991–1994 (Table 4). These combined
changes contributed to the 37 per cent decline in industry capacity and excess
capacity over the same period.
Overall, the results support the theoretical predictions that the introduction
of individual and transferable harvesting rights into a limited-entry and
input-controlled fishery should result in an overall decline in excess capacity.
The results also emphasise the importance of transferability of the harvesting
rights in helping to reduce excess capacity.
6. Concluding remarks
Common-pool resources under open access have long suffered from
excess capacity because output is rivalrous, such that investments in
increased capacity at a firm level may be profitable, but at the industry
level, they fail to increase the total yield that is fixed by nature. In fact,
such increases in industry capacity often tend to place additional harvest
pressures on the resource stock. The traditional method of controlling
this problem has been to restrict the number of harvesters and control
their inputs. Limited-entry regulations have often been unsuccessful at
preventing ongoing increases in excess capacity because firms are fre-
quently able to substitute from regulated to unregulated inputs (Dupont
1991; Squires 1994). Consequently, in some common-pool industries with
ill-structured property rights, such as fisheries, substantial excess capacity
exists.
To help address the excess capacity and rent dissipation problem in open-
access fisheries, regulators are increasingly using individual output controls in
the form of individual and transferable harvest rights. Using data from the
BC halibut fishery before and after the introduction of individual harvest
rights, measures of capacity output, excess capacity and capacity utilisation
are calculated. The results indicate that the introduction of individual and
transferable harvest rights has coincided with substantial and statistically sig-
nificant reductions in capacity output. The results also indicate that median
capacity utilisation is higher for large versus small vessels both before and
after the introduction of harvesting rights.
Capacity in the fishery declined, in part, because the switch to individual
harvesting rights allowed a change in season length from 6 days to 214 days,
and subsequently to 245 days. The much longer fishing season reduced the
previously hectic pace of fishing and allowed firms to substitute some variable
inputs with increased time at sea. Another important contributing factor to
the reduced excess capacity has been the transferability of individual harvest
rights that has created an opportunity cost from harvesting, allowed firms to
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exit the fishery and remove their capacity, and permitted remaining firms to
expand their output to achieve a better scale of production. Overall, the
empirical results confirm our theoretical insight that individual and trans-
ferable harvest rights, given sufficient time, and relative to limited-entry
regulations, are able to reduce excess capacity and increase firm capacity
utilisation.
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Appendix I
Measuring capacity using data envelopment analysis
The nonparametric DEA approach proposed by Fa¨re (1984) and Fa¨re
et al. (1989) estimates capacity output given the capacity base, resource
stock and environmental conditions. Capacity output corresponds to the
output that could be produced, given full and efficient utilisation of vari-
able inputs under normal operating conditions, and given the constraints
imposed by the fixed factors, the state of technology and resource stock.
Firms do not produce at full capacity if they are technically inefficient or
employ insufficient levels of variable inputs given the constraints. Different
levels of the resource stock would yield different levels of capacity in the
stock-flow production technology of a common-pool resource industry,
such as a fishery.
Following Fa¨re et al. (1989), we define j = 1,…, J observations or firms in
an industry producing M outputs, l 2 RMþ , by using a vector of inputs
xj 2 RNþ, where RMþ and RNþ are sets of all non-negative real numbers, and N is
partitioned into fixed, Fx, and variable inputs, Vx. ljm denotes the mth output
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produced by the jth firm and xjn denotes the utilisation of the nth input by the
jth firm. Inputs and outputs satisfy the following assumptions:
















ujm>0; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; J
Condition (i) imposes the assumption that each producer uses non-negative
amounts of each input to produce non-negative amounts of each output.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) require total or aggregate production of positive
amounts of every output and total or aggregate employment of positive
amounts of every input. Conditions (iv) and (v) require that each firm
employs a positive amount of at least one input to produce a positive
amount of at least one output. Zero levels are permitted for some inputs
and outputs.
Fa¨re et al. (1989) illustrate that capacity at the plant level, following
Johansen (1968), could be estimated by partitioning the fixed (Fx) and









zjujm; m ¼ 1; . . . ;M;
XJ
j¼1
zjxjn  xjn; n 2 Fx
XJ
j¼1
zjxjn ¼ kjnxjn; n 2 Vx
zj  0; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; J
kjn  0;
where h is an output-oriented measure of technical efficiency (h ‡ 1.0), and zj
is the intensity variable for the jth observation (which serves to construct the
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technology by taking convex combinations of the data).13 Multiplying the
observed output by h gives an estimate of capacity output.14 Capacity can
also be estimated by solving problem (2) without the variable input con-
straints. Problem (2) imposes a strong disposability in outputs and constant




13 The intensity vector Z = (Z1, Z2,…, ZJ) 2 RJþ denotes the intensity levels at which each
of the J firms or producers operate. The Z vector allows a decrease or increase of observed pro-
duction activities (input and output levels) to construct unobserved but feasible activities. The
Z vector provides weights that are used to construct the linear segments of the piecewise, linear
technology (i.e. the reference technology constructed by DEA).
14 Technical efficiency from an output orientation indicates the maximum potential levels by
which all outputs could be increased with no change in input levels. A technical efficiency score
of 1.0 indicates technical efficiency. The value of h is restricted to ‡ 1.0. If h>1.0, production
is inefficient and output levels could be increased by h) 1.0. h is the inverse of an output dis-
tance function and equals the ratio of the maximum potential output to the observed output
level. The expansion in output levels is radial, so that output levels are kept in fixed propor-
tions. Multiplying the observed output by h gives the estimate of capacity output.
15 Estimating capacity without the variable input constraints indicates that the variable
inputs are in fact decision variables, in line with the Johansen definition that assumes input
fixity combined with unlimited access to the variable input dimensions. In addition, strong dis-
posability of outputs implies that the producer has the ability to dispose of unwanted outputs
with no private costs.
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